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NO. 10 MARCH 2020 Introduction 
The African Continental Free Trade Area 
Perspectives for Africa, Policy Choices for Europe 
Evita Schmieg 
The Agreement Establishing the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) came 
into force in May 2019. Ultimately the AfCFTA is designed to create a comprehensive 
African market; what is does at this stage is set in motion a set of complex and fore-
seeably very lengthy negotiations. The outcome of that process will not yet be full 
free trade in Africa, but it will bring about a reduction in tariffs with the potential 
to stimulate production and trade and boost regional value chains. It is, however, too 
early to be discussing modifying the European Union’s trade policy towards Africa, 
or for this to be an issue for the upcoming German Council Presidency. Nevertheless, 
Germany and the European Union should continue to follow and support the process 
of establishing the AfCFTA, which is an important political process with significant 
long-term economic potential for Africa. 
 
Fifty-four African states have signed the 
Agreement Establishing the AfCFTA, of 
which twenty-eight have also ratified (as of 
October 2019). In essence, the point of the 
AfCFTA is to abolish tariffs on 90 percent 
of goods tariff lines. For the most sensitive 
7 percent of products the process will be 
phased over a period of ten to fifteen years; 
3 percent of tariff lines (not exceeding 10 
percent of the value of imports) will enjoy 
permanent protection. The AfCFTA will 
create a market encompassing 1.2 billion 
people and a combined GDP of about $2.5 
trillion. 
AfCFTA Issues 
The objectives of market opening are laid 
out in the agreement, but how they are to 
be achieved remains unclear. Important 
prerequisites for an actual liberalisation 
of trade have yet to be negotiated; these 
include for example specific agreement 
on the products for which tariffs are to be 
lowered, how far to reduce and when to do 
so (so-called liberalisation lists), as well as 
rules of origin. The latter form an essential 
part of any free trade agreement, in order 
to prevent third-country producers from 
exploiting the arrangement. Rules of origin 
define the extent to which a product must 
have been processed in the partner country 
in order to qualify for the tariff reduction. 
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These provisions are still missing from the 
AfCFTA agreement. In other words, now 
that it has entered into force its significance 
is that negotiations continue, while eco-
nomic impacts will have to wait. 
Incidentally, the concept of the AfCFTA 
agreement “coming into force” has created 
misunderstanding in Europe, where it 
is understood rather differently. When 
a European free trade agreement (FTA) 
“comes into force” tariffs are lowered im-
mediately and the economic effects are 
felt directly. 
The AfCFTA is supposed to liberalise 
trade in services as well as goods. But the 
talks on services are also only just begin-
ning, so the shape of the outcome and 
potential effects are not yet foreseeable. 
African states and regional organisations 
have even less experience with negotiations 
on services than they do with those on 
opening trade in goods, and the challenges 
are correspondingly large. Although the 
negotiations are based on the WTO’s multi-
lateral General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATS), Africa’s existing regional 
economic communities (RECs) have to date 
pursued different approaches and accrued 
different experiences as far as liberalisation 
of services is concerned. The current impact 
of the AfCFTA in the sphere of services is 
simply that a common approach has been 
agreed. As experience at the regional level 
demonstrates, the talks will require time. 
For example in the Southern African Devel-
opment Community (SADC) the discussion 
about internal market opening for six ser-
vice sectors continued for six years. 
With the AfCFTA treaty the African 
states are seeking a comprehensive modern 
agreement that covers trade in goods and 
services but also addresses new issues. Ar-
rangements on freedom of movement strive 
for extensive mobility and the abolition of 
visas. But given that any country may im-
pose any type of restriction under Article 
34, the real value of the agreement remains 
to be seen. In a second phase of negotia-
tions, it is planned to prepare a set of rules 
for investment, competition policy and in-
tellectual property. The proposed schedule 
for this (early 2020) has already been 
missed. In terms of the new issues, it 
is unlikely that the partners will go any 
further than WTO rules and existing 
regional cooperation arrangements. 
More Regional Agreements 
It is not yet entirely clear how the ongoing 
negotiating process will proceed. While 
the objective of establishing a single African 
Free Trade Area under the auspices of the 
African Union might create the impression 
that the outcome will be one single African 
liberalisation instrument, within which 
each country presents its liberalisation offer 
to all other members of the African Union 
before a single agreement is negotiated on 
that basis. That would correspond to the ap-
proach taken in the WTO. But it is already 
becoming apparent that this is not how the 
process is going to unfold. 
The preamble to the AfCFTA agreement 
identifies eight RECs as “building blocks” 
for the AfCFTA (see figure on page 3). Any 
liberalisation of trade under the AfCFTA 
(over and above that within the RECs) will 
initially occur between African countries 
and regions that do not as yet have FTAs, 
for example between the East African Com-
munity (EAC) and the Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS). The an-
nex to the report on the AfCFTA for the 
African Union Summit on 10/11 February 
2019 describes the next steps; the number 
of intra-African economic communities will 
in fact initially increase until the AfCFTA 
has been implemented. 
Further complicating the negotiations, 
the degree of integration differs within the 
individual RECs. Not all of Africa’s RECs 
are yet free trade areas with fully liberalised 
internal trade: the Union du Maghreb 
Arabe (UMA) is practically insignificant for 
example, whereas the SADC has already 
liberalised 90 percent of its internal trade. 
There are also overlaps between the vari-
ous RECs (see figure). Most African states 
belong to multiple free trade areas, which 
may have different tariffs, rules of origin 
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and standards. The image of a “spaghetti 
bowl” is frequently used to describe this 
situation. How these problems are to be 
solved and how quickly a further market 
opening moving towards an AfCFTA can 
occur thus depends on the political will and 
engagement of governments and regional 
communities, and on the progress they 
make. The role of the African Union here is 
to drive and possibly facilitate the process. 
Concern over Competition 
Hindering Integration 
One of the trickiest problems for the pro-
cess of developing the AfCFTA is the smaller 
countries’ worries about competition from 
larger countries with stronger export sec-
tors. The International Monetary Fund 
points out that intra-African trade flows are 
dominated by a handful of “hubs”: Côte 
d’Ivoire, Kenya, Senegal and South Africa. 
These enjoy a head start in the AfCFTA and 
can expect first and foremost to increase 
their exports. 
The IMF therefore believes that taking 
the concerns of the weaker nations seriously 
is crucial for progress in the further nego-
tiations. But these countries are especially 
likely to adopt protectionist stances and to 
hesitate to open their own markets, partly 
because they fear growing competition 
within a free trade area. Attempts have 
been made to address these worries in the 
talks with “special and differential treat-
ment” for weaker countries. The least devel-
oped countries in the AfCFTA have already 
been granted the concession of phasing 
in their tariff reductions over a period of 
thirteen years rather than ten. But special 
treatment in the sense of exemptions from 
market opening will not apply automatical-
ly; interested countries will have to demon-
strate their eligibility on the basis of spe-
cific criteria. This raises the risk that coun-
tries with weak administrative and finan-
cial capacities will find it difficult to apply 
for and retain their special treatment, and 
will instead simply neglect to fulfil their 
commitments to open their markets. 
Perspectives Going Forward 
With the negotiation and ratification of the 
AfCFTA agreement, the AU Commission has 
injected new dynamism into the regional 
integration process. The step from talks – 
and even negotiated outcomes – to con-
crete economic effects is large, however. 
Criticisms of the African Union’s pressure 
to deliver rapid results have also been heard 
from government circles, for example in 
Southern Africa. They also point out a dif-
ficulty: a timeframe may have been agreed 
but there is still a danger of foot-dragging 
on implementation. It is therefore likely 
that integration will proceed (more) dy-
namically in those regions that are already 
committed to a more open trade policy. 
In this vein, the talks in Southern Africa 
between the Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU) and the EAC are said to be 
going well, while the process of opening 
between countries that pursue a more pro-
tectionist approach, such as Nigeria or Zim-
babwe, continues to proceed at a crawl. 
On top of this, the stimulating effect of 
tariff reductions on internal trade differs 
between regions. This is because other fac-
tors often restrict trade more than tariffs – 
for example high trade costs through quotas 
and licences, sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures, technical standards, and bureau-
cratic procedures. Another problem is the 
lack of export diversification in many Afri-
can countries. States with more extensive 
product diversification are more strongly 
integrated in regional trade. As a result, the 
relative importance of regional trade for 
individual countries has risen rapidly after 
tariff reductions in certain regions, for 
example in the SADC, but not in others 
such as the Communauté Economique et 
Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC). 
Even if the AfCFTA has yet to produce 
economic outcomes, significant steps have 
been achieved: The shared commitment to 
an objective of a 90-percent market opening 
within Africa represents an important con-
sensus. But the really significant aspect of 
the AfCFTA is that it has outlined liberalisa-
tion procedures that serve as a “template”, 
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in the sense of the structure of the liberali-
sation schedules that are required for sub-
sequent bilateral and regional negotiations. 
Once they have been used by a country or 
region, all subsequent talks with African 
partners become easier. Namibia for exam-
ple has reportedly already used the AfCFTA 
templates for its negotiations within the tri-
partite of EAC, SADC and COMESA (Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa).  
Finally, the founding of the AfCFTA chan-
nels private-sector interest more strongly 
to the African market. Niger’s president 
regards the positive outcomes of the Intra-
African Trade Fair in Cairo in December 
2018 as a first result of the AfCFTA. At the 
event contracts worth more than $30 bil-
lion were concluded between the 1,086 
exhibitors. 
The Economic Potential of 
the AfCFTA 
There are many good reasons to complete 
the AfCFTA. Especially in smaller African 
economies, such as Namibia with a popu-
lation of about 2.5 million, expanding the 
market in the context of a free trade area 
would allow industry to realise economies 
of scale. These are potentiated by the con-
stellation of an expanding middle class 
within a rapidly growing population. Ac-
cording to UN estimates, Africa’s popu-
lation is expected to double to about 2.6 
billion by 2050. 
The figure for intra-African imports as 
a proportion of total African imports has 
almost tripled over the past two decades 
to reach approximately 13 percent ($73.6 
billion). But this welcome development 
conceals widely diverging trends in differ-
ent sub-regions. While South Africa alone 
is the source of 35 percent of intra-African 
exports and receives 15.5 percent of intra-
African imports, other major countries 
are poorly integrated. Algeria, Egypt and 
Nigeria together account for half of Africa’s 
GDP but are only marginally involved in 
intra-African trade, which accounts for just 
11 percent of their imports and exports. 
The SADC, on the other hand, is highly 
integrated with its members conducting 
a significant share of their trade with 
each other (20 percent). Most intra-African 
trade – about three-quarters – occurs 
within the most important regional organi-
sations, above all in Eastern and Southern 
Africa. 
Intra-African trade offers great potential 
to establish regional value chains and boost 
both growth and development. This is be-
cause more manufactured goods are traded 
within Africa than African states export to 
third countries. Products with high added 
value such as vehicles and cosmetics rep-
resent about 40 percent of intra-African 
trade (raw materials 44 percent, agricultural 
products about 16 percent). Exports to coun-
tries outside Africa on the other hand are 
still largely dominated by raw materials 
(approx. 75 percent). 
To what extent might the AfCFTA now 
contribute to intra-African trade? As already 
laid out above, it will be a very long time 
before the economic effects are felt. Accord-
ing to the IMF, liberalisation of 90 percent 
of trade within the AfCFTA would lead to a 
comparatively modest 16 percent increase 
in trade. The reason for this is that 90 per-
cent liberalisation may sound impressive 
but is not in fact very ambitious. In most 
countries most imports are already tariff-
free; in Namibia for example the figure is 
about 60 percent. So if 10 percent of prod-
ucts are excluded from tariff reductions, 
this allows the most dynamic categories to 
be excluded. The economists Peter Draper 
and Andreas Freytag go as far as concluding 
that this lack of ambition will prevent the 
AfCFTA from achieving any really meaning-
ful liberalisation. 
The negotiations and the launch of the 
AfCFTA have generated a certain dynamism 
and expectation – both within and outside 
Africa – to actually achieve economic re-
sults. But, especially in view of the sobering 
balance of liberalisation efforts to date in 
certain regions, two real dangers must be 
noted. Firstly, decisions to reduce tariffs 
may not necessarily be implemented. Sec-
ondly, the definitions and obligations could 
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be so unambitious that even implementa-
tion leads to little change in real trade, for 
example if the rules of origin are very strict 
or the exemptions very generous. Great 
effort expended on meagre results would 
be the worst outcome, and would dissipate 
the drive for further liberalisation. 
Little Effect on Agreements 
with Third States 
African states and regions already have vari-
ous agreements with counterparts outside 
Africa. The most important of these are the 
economic partnership agreements (EPAs) 
with the European Union; there are also 
free trade agreements and preferential 
agreements (the latter covering only a selec-
tion of sectors) with other countries and 
regions such as the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) or Mercosur. Other FTAs 
are currently being negotiated, for example 
with the United Kingdom, between the 
SACU and India, and soon also with the 
United States. 
FTAs with countries and regions outside 
Africa remain possible under Article 4 of 
the AfCFTA Protocol on Trade in Goods, as 
long as they do not “impede or frustrate 
the objectives” of the AfCFTA. 
What does this mean concretely? Article 
4 states unambiguously that the AfCFTA 
does not affect existing agreements like 
EPAs, and thus answers a question often 
asked in Germany: At this stage African 
trade integration does not necessitate a 
comprehensive new agreement between 
the European Union and the African Union 
to replace the EPAs. Article 4 also confirms 
that individual countries and regions will 
retain the ability to conclude new agree-
ments with third countries. This is not a 
problem because the AfCFTA – unlike a 
customs union – does not require uniform 
tariffs vis-à-vis third countries. As a free 
trade area it liberalises only trade between 
the participating countries. All participants 
thus retain the freedom to conclude their 
own agreements, including different exter-
nal tariffs. 
It is important for Africa that tariffs for 
third countries outside Africa must not be 
lower than those within Africa. The point 
of this is to avoid a situation where an 
agreement – for example with Mercosur – 
could create trade preferences that disad-
vantage intra-African trade. Article 4 of the 
AfCFTA Protocol on Trade in Goods there-
fore requires that all preferences granted to 
third countries under FTAs must also be 
granted to the African partners within the 
AfCFTA under the principle of reciprocity. 
The same is also planned for services. If for 
example the SACU lowers a tariff for India 
it must also offer the same to its partners in 
the AfCFTA (for example in future poten-
tially Côte d’Ivoire) provided that the African 
partners are willing to lower their own 
corresponding tariffs. 
The European Union’s EPAs already 
contain such so-called regional integration 
clauses, even without a requirement of 
reciprocity. Admittedly these apply only 
within the respective EPA regions, and not 
outside them. The regional integration 
clause in the AfCFTA is therefore a signifi-
cant expansion that ensures that tariffs for 
all other African partners (not just those 
within the respective EPA region) are at 
least as low as those for the European 
Union (or partners in other future FTAs). 
This provision is central, but tends to ham-
per ongoing negotiations, including the 
intra-African. This is because the extent to 
which potential tariff reductions can and 
must also apply to the African partners in 
the AfCFTA must always be considered in 
future (bilateral) negotiations. 
Conclusions: Implications for 
Germany and the European Union 
The AfCFTA can only be understood as a 
very long-term project. Shaping it offers 
the opportunity to boost value creation and 
generate new employment via an increase 
in intra-African trade in finished goods. The 
European Union should continue to contrib-
ute to this process through Aid for Trade 
(AfT). That means supporting the AU’s Com-
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mission and negotiating processes, and the 
implementation by the national govern-
ments of the decisions made in the African 
Union. Advancing integration within the 
RECs and the trade negotiations between 
them will remain decisive for quite some 
time. Because the AfCFTA will be realised 
via these steps, the RECs are ultimately the 
“building blocks” of the AfCFTA. 
In order to achieve concrete results it 
will also be necessary to enable the private 
sector to actually make use of the new mar-
ket opportunities that arise. That means 
information about markets, and frequently 
also work to enhance industrial competi-
tiveness. In order to attract investment – 
whether local, regional or from third coun-
tries – African countries must continue to 
improve the underlying conditions and 
realise trade facilitation. The G20 Compact 
with Africa (CwA) and the European Exter-
nal Investment Plan (under the Africa-
Europe Alliance) are frameworks that 
should be used to such support efforts. 
The talks about the successor to the 
Cotonou Agreement between the European 
Union and the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific 
(ACP) states offer space to agree principles 
for such AfT approaches for promoting re-
gional integration. If not completed before-
hand, this task may fall to the German 
Council Presidency, which would then have 
an opportunity to set its own priorities. It 
can be assumed that the issue of AfT pro-
moting regional integration can be handled 
harmoniously, unlike the “real sticking-
points” of the post-Cotonou negotiations 
such as the question of how to anchor 
migration in the agreement and its regional 
pillars. 
The question of whether ratification 
of the AfCFTA agreement means that the 
European Union should start negotiations 
with the African Union about an EU-AU 
trade agreement to supersede the existing 
EPAs has already been discussed in Ger-
many. Currently such negotiations would 
be neither possible nor sensible. And the 
African side has no incentive, because most 
of the states of Sub-Saharan Africa already 
enjoy completely free access to the EU’s 
markets. This applies not only to all the 
countries that participate in EPAs, but also 
to all the LDCs, which profit from unilateral 
EU trade preferences. South Africa and the 
states of North Africa already enjoy exten-
sive tariff-free access for industrial goods. 
Nevertheless, Jean-Claude Juncker, when he 
was President of the European Commission, 
stated that the European Union would be 
open to trade talks with the African Union 
once the AfCFTA was completed, if this 
were desired by the African side. As such 
the European Union has demonstrated the 
necessary political willingness, to which 
Africa may return. But that cannot be ex-
pected for the time being. 
Finally, the African states will need their 
energy and capacities for the negotiations 
on completing the AfCFTA. Especially in 
view of the current weakness of the multi-
lateral system they also have an interest in 
free trade agreements with other partners 
above all in Asia, but also in Latin America, 
and with the United States. Africa’s nego-
tiating power would naturally be greater if 
African countries were already able to oper-
ate jointly as a pan-African customs union. 
But the first step is to complete the AfCFTA. 
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